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organ allows the UN to retain a degree of control and supervision over UNHCR that corresponds with its
functional autonomy, and that the terms of UNHCR’s Statue determines the scope of that control and
supervision. When considered through organisational accountability, however, complex considerations
involving hierarchy, “unspoken authority”, political influence and horizontal accountability become evident.
An understanding of the layered nature of the relationships of UNHCR creates a clearer perception of the
body’s accountability, and the relationship between the UN and UNHCR, which is also represented by a
conceptual model, provides insight into the limits of what UNHCR can and cannot achieve as part of its
mandate, and in its wider role as a humanitarian agency. It is only when the nature of a global decision-making
body’s accountability relationships are understood that the expectations, or accountability obligations, that
flow from them will emerge. To identify what a global decision-making body is accountable for before
identifying its relationships may create expectations of accountability that do not relate to the body’s
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UNHCR as a Subsidiary Organ of the UN: Plurality,
Complexity and Accountability
Niamh Kinchin1

Abstract
The global space is a place where decision-making and regulation involve
diverse actors who act outside of State control yet who affect the rights and
obligations of individuals and groups. Its innate plurality speaks against the
temptation to understand accountability as a predetermined concept. Instead, it is
argued that accountability within the global context should be reconceptualised
through the relationships of global decision-making bodies.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a
subsidiary organ of the UN. If an enquiry into what UNHCR is accountable for is
undertaken through an examination of its relationship with the UN according to a
type of accountability, rather than as a measurable outcome of externally imposed,
uniform “accountability standards”, divergent and potentially conflicting
accountability obligations will be revealed. As discussed in this paper, when the
relationship between UNHCR and the UN is considered through legal
accountability, it becomes evident that the position of UNHCR as a subsidiary
organ allows the UN to retain a degree of control and supervision over UNHCR
that corresponds with its functional autonomy, and that the terms of UNHCR’s
Statue determines the scope of that control and supervision. When considered
through organisational accountability, however, complex considerations involving
hierarchy, “unspoken authority”, political influence and horizontal accountability
become evident.
An understanding of the layered nature of the relationships of UNHCR creates
a clearer perception of the body’s accountability, and the relationship between the
UN and UNHCR, which is also represented by a conceptual model, provides
insight into the limits of what UNHCR can and cannot achieve as part of its
mandate, and in its wider role as a humanitarian agency. It is only when the nature
1
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law. Her current research considers accountability within the global space in the context of
international refugee law, with particular focus on the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
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of a global decision-making body’s accountability relationships are understood
that the expectations, or accountability obligations, that flow from them will
emerge. To identify what a global decision-making body is accountable for before
identifying its relationships may create expectations of accountability that do not
relate to the body’s operations or relationships, and will produce skewed results of
its accountability performance, potentially impeding the development of effective
and relevant accountability mechanisms.

Keywords. Accountability, UNHCR, UN, Subsidiary organ, Relationships,
Obligations, Standards, Indicators, Inter-Institutional, Global governance
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Beyond the traditional boundaries of sovereignty and international law exists
the global space. A forum for global or transnational administration, 2 where
decision-making and regulation involve diverse actors who largely act outside of
State control, yet who affect the rights and obligations of individuals and groups,
it is a context whose scope defies identifiable parameters. If there is a legal order,
it is fragmented. If there is a constituency, it is a fractured one. The conditions for
an accountability deficit are there, and if accountability solutions are to be
effective the innate plurality of the global space must be acknowledged in a way
that recognises that accountability cannot be defined through preconceptions of
what that concept should entail. An examination of the inter-institutional
relationships of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
demonstrates that when accountability is understood as a product of the
relationships of a global decision-making body (“global body”), it becomes
responsive to the unique challenges and obligations of that body, as well as to the
way that external principles such as international law or human rights impact it. If
what a global decision-making body is accountable for is identified before its
relationships, there is a risk of the creation of expectations of accountability that
may not relate to that body’s functions and purpose. It is the relationships of
global bodies that produce its accountability obligations and an appreciation of
those obligations, including how they intersect and conflict with each other, is
crucial to the successful design and implementation of effective and responsive
accountability mechanisms.
UNHCR is a special programme and subsidiary organ of the United Nations
(UN). If an enquiry into what UNHCR is accountable for is undertaken through
an examination of its relationship with the UN according to a ‘type’ of
accountability, rather than as a measurable outcome of externally imposed
uniform “accountability standards”, then divergent and potentially conflicting
accountability obligations will emerge, When the relationship between UNHCR
and the UN is considered through legal accountability it becomes evident that the
position of UNHCR as a subsidiary organ allows the UN to retain a degree of
control and supervision over UNHCR that corresponds with its functional
autonomy3 and that the terms of UNHCR’s Statue4 determines the scope of that
control and supervision. Yet this is an incomplete picture of UNHCR’s
accountability obligations. UNHCR’s relationship with the UN can also be
considered through organisational accountability, which introduces complex
considerations involving hierarchy, “unspoken authority”, political influence and
horizontal accountability. An understanding of the layered nature of the
relationships of UNHCR creates a clearer perception of the body’s accountability,
and the relationship between the UN and UNHCR provides insight into the limits

2

B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law” 68 (3-4) Law and Contemporary Problems (2005) p. 16.
3
International Law Association, Third Report Consolidated, Revised and Enlarged Version
of Recommended Rules and Practices (RRP’s) New Dehli Conference 2002, 6 (ILA Report).
4
Resolution on Statute of the High Commissioner for Refugees, GA Res 428(V) UN
GAOR, 5th sess, 325th plen mtg, Doc/A/Res/428(v) (1950).
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of what UNHCR can and cannot achieve as part of its mandate, and in its wider
role as a humanitarian agency.
1.

A Plural Approach to Accountability in the Global Space

In the search for a solution to the accountability deficit in the global space, the
diversity of that context should not be overlooked in favour of an approach that
limits the ability of accountability to respond to plurality. When the requirements
for accountability are standardised, or applied in a uniform way that fails to
consider the unique characteristics of the context in which they operate, or are not
divorced from the assumptions that inform them, the potential for creating
effective accountability solutions is threatened.
One way accountability is standardised is through the use of indicators.
Indicators are used to compare a variety of social and socio-political phenomena
such as corruption,5 the rule of law6 and human trafficking7 in relation to countries,
institutions or corporations, and evaluate their performance by reference to one or
more standards.8 When indicators are used to “measure” accountability they tend
to cast adrift substantive issues in favour of the kind of procedural standards that
are generally considered to be components of accountable governance, such as
transparency and participation. For example, One World Trust is a London-based
independent charity that produces research on accountability and global
governance. Its Global Accountability Framework (GAF) develops an indicator
framework that is designed to measure the accountability of intergovernmental
organisations, transnational corporations and international non-governmental
organisations. 9 GAF “unpacks” accountability into what it calls “dimensions”,
which are transparency, participation, self-evaluation and “complaint and
response”. 10 These dimensions are further separated into indicators, 11 each of
which has levels12 that are scored from 0 – 3 according to a scaled system.
The difficulty with such procedural indicators is that when are separated from
substantive content, they risk losing their relevance. Indicators that measure
5

Transparency International, a global civil society organisation, produces an annual
Corruption Perception Index.
6
In 2002, UNDP developed a Political Freedom Index, which included “rule of law” as an
indicator.
7
Trafficking in Persons indicators have been produced by the US State Department.
8
K.E. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global
Governance” 46 Law and Society Review (2012) p. 71.
9
Pathways to Accountability II: The 2011 Revised Global Accountability Framework
(2011) (‘2011 GAF Report’) One World Trust <http://oneworldtrust.org/publications/cat_view/64publications-by-project/69-principles-of-accountability> p. 18.
10
Ibid 55.
11
Accountability strategy, transparency, participation – external stakeholders, participation
– internal member control/good governance, participation – shareholder control/good governance,
evaluation (IGOs and INGOs), social and environmental evaluation (TNCs), complaints and
response – external and complaints and response – internal. 2011 GAF Report, p. 31.
12
For example the indicator “Accountability Strategy” is broken into the following three
levels: 1) Stakeholder mapping and prioritization; 2) Accountability mapping and action plan; 3)
Commitment to and awareness of existing external accountability commitments.
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substantive issues, such as the quality of business laws and institutions13 or social
and economic development14 do so based upon collective knowledge, experience
and expertise. The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators measure regulatory
output in relation to dealing with construction permits, getting electricity,
registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading
across borders, enforcing contracts, closing a business and employing workers.15
These indicators are understood to represent substantive elements that are
common to all business regulation. Indicators that are used to measure
accountability of governance consider procedural issues, which is relatively
unproblematic in the domestic context because there is a somewhat cohesive
understanding of governance that bonds procedural accountability to substantive
governance elements. For example, the democratic legitimacy that underpins
many of the world’s governance structures has influenced the development of
procedural rights, such as natural justice or “procedural fairness”. However, in the
global context, governance methodology is disparate, making it difficult to “pin”
accountability indicators on concrete and measurable outcomes, which then
encourages a tendency to frame accountability according to the commentator’s
experiences of domestic socio-political and legal traditions.
Commentators and decision makers from common law countries may find it
difficult to divorce their notion of accountability from responsible government
and the institutional checks and balances that uphold it. 16 Commentators and
decision makers from civil law countries will tend to understand the “adjudication
of accountability” (i.e. administrative and judicial review) to require a high level
of involvement by judges in evidence collection and policy making, and an
inquisitorial participation in the decision-making process.17 Whilst experience of
pre-existing domestic accountability mechanisms serve as an important tool in the
institutional design of accountability mechanisms in the global space, a failure to
identify underlying assumptions may result in an incongruence that will be
counter-productive to designing and implementing effective solutions to the
global accountability deficit.
A second challenge posed by the use of procedural accountability indicators in
the global space is that their purpose may be subverted in order to legitimise the
actions of an organisation. One function of indicators is standard setting. 18
13

Such as the “Doing Business” indicators, which are utilised by the World Bank. See K.E.
Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance” 46 Law
and Society Review (2012) pp.90-95.
14
See Davis, Kingsbury and Merry’s discussion of the Human Development Index. Ibid pp.
95-99.
15
Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises
World
Bank
<publications.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=24391> visited 15
October 2013.
16
See generally P. Finn, “Public Trust and Public Accountability” 3 Griffith Law Review
(1994) pp. 224–244; J. Goldring, “Accountability of Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and
“Responsible Government” 11 Federal Law Review (1980) pp. 353-385.
17
See B. Schwartz, French Administrative Law and the Common Law World (The Law
Book Exchange, New Jersey, 2006) pp. 132–135.
18
K.E. Davis, B. Kingsbury and S.E. Merry, “Indicators as a Technology of Global
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Externally imposed indicators act as a guide to “community values” and will
serve as a useful tool with which to design an organisation’s standards. For
example, transparency, which it can be argued is a fundamental expectation within
a democratic community, may be transformed into a procedural standard that
requires policy documents to be published on an Internet database within a certain
amount of time. Although the prospect of community values shaping
organisational behaviour in a practical way is undoubtedly positive, where
indicators are used as a way to create standards that justify “actions to those
whom they affect according to reasons they can accept”19 rather than reflect the
actual accountability obligations that arise from an organisation’s relationships,
the result may be reduced to an exercise of self-legitimisation.
When accountability in the global space is examined in terms of legal
accountability,20 an absence of a cohesive legal order becomes apparent. No one
legal order can claim exclusivity of the global space and although it is not a
lawless frontier by any means, the contribution of many and varied domestic legal
systems, along with the presence of international law, leaves a global legal order
that is fragmented, at best. It follows that without a unified legal ontology the
concept of accountability is vulnerable to being populated by assumptions about
its normative content. For example, calls for democracy at the global level have
been accompanied by claims that a fundamental function of accountability is to
achieve democratic aims. In her examination of the accountability of government
networks, Anne-Marie Slaughter acknowledges that accountability is a complex
concept that can mean different things in different contexts and according to
“different political theories”. 21 At the same time however, she claims that
“determining how to hold these officials” (in relation to officials of networks of
government agencies) democratically accountable becomes a paramount
concern.’22 The influence of differing political theories is acknowledged, yet the
connection between democracy and accountability is assumed. A presumption that
democracy and accountability are inextricable may result in a failure to consider
the challenge of how accountability might adapt to spaces (global or national)
where there is no democracy, as we understand it in its traditional sense.23
Human rights also provide discourse that is a strong normative basis for much
of the commentary on global accountability 24 and is increasingly presumed to
Governance” 46 Law and Society Review (2012) p. 83.
19
M.D. Williams, “Citizenship as Agency within Communities of Shared Fate” in S.
Bernstein and W.D. Coleman (eds.), Unsettled Legitimacy: Political Community, Power, and
Authority in a Global Era (University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2009) p. 43.
20
According to R.W. Grant and R.O. Keohane, legal accountability «refers to the
requirement that agents abide by formal rules and be prepared to justify their actions in those
terms, in courts or quasi-judicial arenas». See R.W. Grant and R.O. Keohane, “Accountability and
Abuses of Power in World Politics” 99 American Political Science Review (2005) p. 17.
21
A-M. Slaughter, “The Accountability of Government Networks” Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 8 (2000-2001) p. 360.
22
Ibid 348 (emphasis added).
23
«Even in a bare monarchical legal order in which there is administrative law, one assumes
that there is accountability to the law of the state». See D. Dyzenhaus, “The Concept of (Global)
Administrative Law” Acta Juridica (2009) p. 6.
24
See e.g., M. Lion, “Human Rights Obligations and Accountability in the Face of Climate
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underpin the policy design and implementation of International Organisations
(IO) and the UN and its agencies. Measuring how accountable a body or agency is
for the “protection of human rights” 25 without a corresponding requirement to
qualify who they are owed to and what they are owed for, risks human rights
accountability becoming a noble but ultimately superficial goal. Human rights of
individuals within the context of administrative decision-making are often
understood as meaning procedural rights, such as transparency, participation and
due process. However, procedural rights may be of limited relevance to a global
body whose decisions do not affect individuals directly. Without adapting human
rights accountability to a specific context and to a specific body, the
implementation of human rights protection into policy and programme design will
be of limited effect.
Another assumption about accountability in the global space is that it is based
on public values. However, hybrid public-private and wholly private organisations
that are also global bodies are not totally receptive to the imposition of the public
values that tend to inform accountability. In the former, both government
representatives and private parties play a role in policy design and decisionmaking. To impose expectations of accountability that are modelled upon public
or “citizen” participation and transparency may fail to recognise the competing
interests of the private participants in the organisation. Wholly private
organisations have no governmental representatives and therefore no particular
responsibility to include transparency and participation in its platform that stems
from a sense of public or political accountability. Measuring or ranking such
global bodies based upon transparency in the same way as an IO will say little
about their platform, stakeholders and relationships and creates straw man
standards in the guise of legitimate expectations of accountability.
Whether through indicators that purport to measure the accountability of
governance, or through assumptions about what accountability means, when
accountability is applied to the global space in a way that fails to recognise the
complexity and plurality of that context, the potential for effective solutions is
compromised. Identification of a recipient of accountability within the global
space is a more layered and complex process than within the domestic context.
Citizen rights and relationships with government at the national level are
commonly described according to political accountability because a clear
relationship exists between the government and the “people”. In the global space,
a fractured constituency may exist but a global demos does not, and as such, the
identity of the recipients of accountability are not immediately clear. If there is a
global constituency, it is made up of interlacing but competing “subChange” 38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2010) p. 543; M. Pallis,
“The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms” 37 International Law and Politics
(2005) pp. 869 and 874.
25
See e.g., J. Wouters, E. Brems, S. Smis, P. Scmitt (eds) Accountability for Human Rights
Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2010); J. M. Woods, “A Human
Rights Framework for Corporate Accountability” 17 ISLA Journal of International and
Comparative Law (2011) pp. 321–334; A. Buchanan & R. O. Keohane, “The Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions” 20 Ethics & International Affairs p. 406.

9

constituencies”, which vie for influence in global governance. 26 Understanding
accountability at the global level requires re-evaluation of the concept of political
accountability to accommodate uncertainty about who it is that global bodies are
accountable to.
Accountability that is limited to pre-conceived standards is not designed to
sufficiently respond to plurality, which is one of the defining characteristics of the
global space. Whilst indicators in particular can demonstrate, in a public and
practical way, how States and global organisations may be “held to account”, it is
questionable whether the concept of global accountability is cohesive enough, or
whether global bodies are sufficiently similar to render a standardised or assumed
understanding of accountability effective within this context.
2.
Accountability through the Looking Glass: How
Institutional Relationships Shape its Accountability Obligations

UNHCR’s

If accountability is to be “achieved” in the global space, it must be understood in
terms of relationships. It is only when the nature of a global body’s relationships
are understood that the expectations that flow from them will emerge. The nature
of a global body’s relationships depends upon the unique nature, objectives and
structure of that body. The expectations that flow from a body’s relationships are
accountability obligations, which describe what a global body is accountable for,
based upon its relationships. Accountability obligations are not autonomous; they
intersect, compete with and undermine each other. Understanding the way that
accountability obligations intersect reveals why a body is not accountable in some
way. Understanding accountability as relationships reflects the fundamental
diversity of the global space and is in contrast to a more traditional method that
defines accountability according to external standards (discussed above) and is
imposed according to whom the body believes itself to be accountable. 27 The
consequence of a “relationship approach” to accountability is that the impact of
the type of accountability (e.g., legal and political accountability) is not
considered until after a global body’s relationships have been identified.
Applying this approach to explore UNHCR’s accountability involves
identification of its relationships and asking what accountability obligations arise
from that relationship, based upon a particular type of accountability. This paper
focuses upon UNHCR’s inter-institutional relationship with the UN, and poses the
question, “what accountability obligations arise when this relationship is
considered through legal and organisational accountability”? The answer reveals
that UNHCR’s accountability obligations compete with and undermine each

26

N. Krisch, “The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law” 17(1) European Journal of
International Law (2006) p. 247, p. 253. Krisch identifies three possible approaches to identifying
constituencies in the global space; nationalist, internationalist and cosmopolitan.
27
According to Kingsbury, a public entity may be accountable to its public, «yet the
decision may be taken by an entity whose public is not the public truly affected». See B.
Kingsbury, “The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law”, Working Paper No 2009/1,
Institute for International Law and Justice, NYU, (2009) p. 42.
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other, and are more complex than a standardised or uniform understanding of
accountability could hope to accommodate.
2.1

UNHCR’s Relationship with the UN: Legal Accountability

The relationship that exists between UNHCR and the UN can be described as
vertical in the sense that it is shaped by UNHCR’s position as a subsidiary organ
and is dictated by the express words of UNHCR’s Statute. However, the limited
terms of UNHCR’s Statute, coupled with expectations of UNHCR’s independence,
define that relationship in such a way as to limit the practical control that the UN,
in the guise of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and ECOSOC, exercises over
UNHCR.
Whilst the relevant parts of the UN Charter and the general law that governs
international institutions dictate the establishment and termination of subsidiary
organs, the power of the subsidiary organ to make decisions is determined by the
limits of its own mandate.28 For a subsidiary organ to be lawfully established, two
pre-conditions must be met. First, it must be established by a principal organ29 and
second, it must be under the authority and control of that principal organ.30 The
parameters of authority and control are not defined by the UN Charter but have
been variously described as the ability of the principal organ to change the terms
of reference and composition of the subsidiary organ, issue policy directives,
receive reports from the subsidiary organ, accept or reject their
recommendations,31 overrule a decision by a subsidiary organ if that decision is
contrary to applicable legal rules and the right to question the way in which the
subsidiary organ has exercised its competence.32 Regardless of how the authority
of the principal organ is defined, it does not extend to dictation of the way that the
subsidiary organ carries out its functions or makes its decisions, the lawfulness of
which is contingent on whether such actions are vires the subsidiary organ’s
mandate. In practice, the degree of control and supervision a principal organ has
over the subsidiary organ is determined not by elusive principles of authority but
by the terms of its mandate and its functional autonomy.33
The terms of UNHCR’s mandate that are relevant to the authority and control
of the UN and thus, which create accountability obligations for UNHCR, are
Paragraphs 3, 9 and 11 of its statute. Paragraph 3 of UNHCR’s Statute requires the
High Commissioner “to follow policy directives given him by the General
28

Ibid 86.
Charter of the United Nations, art 7(2)
30
A subsidiary organ has been defined by the UN as one that is established by or under the
authority of a principal organ. General Assembly Official Records, 9th Session, Annexes, Agenda
Item 67, at p. 13, A/C 1/758, paras. 1 and 2. Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol.
1, p. 228.
31
General Assembly Official Records, 9th Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 67, at p. 13, A/C
1/758, paras. 1 and 2. ILA Report, 5. See also Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol.
I, p. 228.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
29
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Assembly or the Economic and Social Council”.34 Paragraph 9 gives the UNGA
authority to determine additional activities. 35 Although the UNGA does not
specify which of its resolutions deal with “policy” and which determine
“additional activities”, they may be best differentiated by characterising the
former as an elaboration of UNHCR’s activities related to its mandated
responsibilities and the latter as the intention to add new responsibilities. 36 In
practice, Paragraph 3 and 9 translate to the annual adoption of “omnibus”
resolutions, which clarify the UNGA’s concerns and priorities about displacement
on a global basis and “situational” resolutions, which refer to specific countries.37
Finally, Paragraph 11 requires UNHCR to report annually to the UNGA through
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).38
UNHCR’s relationship with ECOSOC, which is a body internal to the UN that
was established to coordinate the work of its 14 specialised agencies,39 is not built
upon the same level of authority/subordination as its relationship with UNGA. As
mentioned above, Paragraph 11 of UNHCR’s statute declares that UNHCR is to
report to the UNGA through ECOSOC. In practice, UNHCR now submits its
annual reports to the UNGA directly,40 removing ECOSOC as a “buffer” between
UNHCR and UNGA, and diminishing any authority that may have been inherent
in this role. According to Paragraph 3 of the Statute, UNHCR still has a
responsibility to follow policy advice provided by ECOSOC. In reality, ECOSOC
resolutions do not tend to dictate policy that exclusively relates to refugees but
instead, deals with matters that may affect refugees, such as violence against
women41 and issues that relate to a particular region or country.42
34

UNHCR Statute, para 3: «The High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given
him by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council.».
35
UNHCR Statute, para 9: «The High Commissioner shall engage in such additional
activities, including repatriation and resettlement, as the General Assembly may determine, within
the limits of the resources placed at his disposal».
36
C. Lewis, UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From treaty to innovation (Routledge,
Abingdon, 2012) p. 52. An example of an UNGA resolution that provides policy guidance (Art 3),
rather than creates additional activities for UNHCR (Art 9) is a request by the UNGA for UNHCR
to improve international and burden sharing. Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees GA
Res 61/137, UN GAOR 61st sess, 81st plen mtg, Agenda item 41, UN Doc A/RES/31/137 (19 Dec
2006).
37
V. Türk, “Freedom from fear: Refugees, the broader forced displacement context and the
underlying international protection regime” in Vincent Chetail (ed), Globalization, Migration and
Human Rights: International law under Review (Bruylant, Brussels, 2007) p. 481.
38
UNHCR Statute, para 11: «The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views
before the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies. The
High Commissioner shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and
Social Council; his report shall be considered as a separate item on the agenda of the General
Assembly».
39
Specialized agencies, i.e. International Monetary Fund (IMF), «are autonomous
organizations working with the UN and each other through the coordinating machinery of the
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To limit the parameters of the relationship between UNHCR and the UN as
being restricted to the terms of UNHCR’s mandate, however, is to underestimate
the importance of functional autonomy to that relationship. UNHCR’s position as
a UN special programme means that it derives international legal personality that
is compatible with its objectives and functions from the UN.43 An ability to act
and speak autonomously is a constitutive element of legal personality44 and as a
holder of international legal personality, regardless of its limitations, UNHCR
exercises a separate will to the UN or member States by taking action that
expresses its “corporate will”45 rather than the “aggregate opinion” of member
states. 46 This action, which has been labelled “UNHCR Doctrine” 47 , describes
UNHCR’s “voice” on refugee issues, or the articulation of its views on such
issues. UNHCR doctrine represents UNHCR’s opinion on what refugee law is,
what is should be and how it applies. Regardless of its form, which includes
handbooks/manuals, policy and background papers, speeches, recommendations
and commentaries, UNHCR doctrine, which has the common characteristic of
being produced by the secretariat of the organisation, rather than by State
representatives, is indicative of UNHCR’s functional autonomy.
Functional autonomy need not be limited to autonomy as understood in relation
to international legal personality. An organisation can also be considered
functionally or “institutionally” autonomous based upon practice, functions and
structure. UNHCR has been delegated a specific field of activity – international
protection - over which it has complete responsibility. A specific field of activity
is synonymous with “technical expertise”, which has been considered evidence of
institutional autonomy.48 Further, it has bureaucratic independence49 in the form
of a self-sufficient, decision-making secretariat, its membership is differently
constituted to the UN and States do not have the direct power to appoint its
executive heads.50
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42
Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of
the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the
Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan ESC Res 2010/31, UN ESCOR, 46th plen mtg, UN
Doc E/2010/31, 23 July 2010.
43
G. Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2011) p. 58.
44
J. d’Aspremont, “The multifaceted concept of autonomy of international organizations
and international legal discourse” in Richard Collins and Nigel D White (eds), International
Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (Routledge, Abingdon, 2011) p. 63.
45
N.D. White, ‘Layers of autonomy in the UN system’ in Richard Collins and Nigel D
White (eds), International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (Routledge, Abingdon, 2011)
p. 301.
46
J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2nd ed, Cambridge, 2002) p. 12.
47
C. Lewis, UNHCR and International Refugee Law: From treaty to innovation (Routledge,
Abingdon, 2012) p. 60.
48
M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in
Global Politics (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2004) p. 24.
49
N.D. White, “Layers of autonomy in the UN system” in R. Collins and N. D. White (eds),
International Organizations and the Idea of Autonomy (Routledge, Abingdon, 2011) p. 302.
50
C. Martini, “States’ Control over New International Organization”, 6 Global Jurist

13

These observations are not made to argue that UNHCR is a completely
autonomous organisation. The fact that it is a subsidiary organ is enough to
counter such a suggestion. However, UNHCR has developed significant features
of autonomy in a way that ensures that the UN’s relationship with UNHCR is
carried out according to what can be described as a “limited control model”.
“Limited control” means that the UNGA or ECOSOC do not generally act beyond
the terms of UNHCR’s Statute, leaving UNHCR with significant independence in
decision-making, policy development and advice. The accountability obligations
created by the relationship are limited to those specifically created by UNHCR’s
statute (Paragraphs 3, 9, and 11) and more generally, to account for the way it
carries out its competence. Despite reference to UNHCR being «under the
authority of the General Assembly» in Paragraph 1 of the Statute, the UN is not
intended to exercise unbridled power over UNHCR – at least not when considered
through legal accountability.
It has been observed that UNHCR, although «born with little autonomy and
few prospects for expansion» has been «able to capitalize on world events and use
its authority to greatly expand both the groups of people it assisted and the kinds
of assistance it could give».51 This is perhaps, what ultimately drives the limited
control model by the UN – recognition of the fundamental need for UNHCR to
remain responsive to social and political change.
2.2

UNHCR’s Relationship with the UN: organisational accountability

Like any organisation, much of what UNHCR does is dictated not by rules and
legal obligations, but by the way it is designed and how its practice manifests.
When UNHCR is understood through an open systems perspective, which is an
organisational theory that focuses upon an organisation in relation to its context,52
a significant part of its practice becomes its interactions between internal and
external stakeholders. These interactions, or institutional relationships, are driven
by mutual accountability obligations that rely upon the structure, systems and
processes53 of the organisation, rather than its legal framework. Drawing upon the
objective of organisational theory to understand how organisations function and
relate to their environment, 54 accountability in this context is understood as
organisational accountability. When placed within the parameters of
organisational accountability, the relationship between UNHCR and the UN
remains vertical, creating obligations for both UNHCR and the UN that are based
Advances (2006) p. 24.
51
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on UNHCR’s position within the UN system, and which can conflict with the
limited legal accountability obligations inherent to the relationship.
The hierarchical nature of the relationship between the UN and UNHCR
reinforced by a number of services and programmes that specify and extend the
kind of accountability obligations that are owed by UNHCR. The first of these
services is the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which was
established in 1994 and is the UN’s internal accountability mechanism. The OIOS
operates as an independent office that assists the Secretary-General in the
oversight of the UN through monitoring, internal audit, inspection, evaluation and
investigation.55 In particular, it ensures agency compliance with resolutions, rules
and policy and seeks to prevent «fraud, waste, abuse, malfeasance and
mismanagement». 56 The OIOS creates obligations for UNHCR by putting
procedures in place that ensure that UNHCR, along with other bodies within the
UN system, is accountable for the efficient and effective delivery of the
“organisation’s activities”. Further, it ensures that it is answerable, and
accountable, for misconduct. The OIOS has conducted two investigations into
allegations of UNHCR misconduct. The first, undertaken in 2002, investigated
allegations of sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers within refugee camps
in West Africa.57 The second involved the establishment of a specialised task force
to investigate allegations of corruption at the UNHCR office in Nairobi. 58
Although the OIOS was unable to verify the alleged incidents that precipitated the
investigation into sexual exploitation, it found that sexual exploitation of refugees
was “real”. The corruption allegations however, were verified, with the task force
finding that refugees were being asked to pay money for positive status
determination and a number of people, including UNHCR staff and Kenyan police
officers, were arrested. The fact that it was UNHCR itself who requested that
OIOS investigate the allegations in both cases does not detract from the fact that
the OIOS ensures that UNHCR is accountable to the higher levels of the UN (i.e.
the Secretary-General) for the actions of its staff and partners. The final paragraph
of the report into the investigation of corruption in Nairobi contains comments
made by UNHCR acknowledging as such.
The situation that led to the need for this investigation is indeed regrettable, but
UNHCR has been able to learn and implement many lessons from the
investigation. As a result of the experience in Kenya, UNHCR will in the coming
months become a much more accountable organization, management and
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performance will be strengthened and the oversight and investigation capacity
will be improved59.

When UNHCR comments that it will become “a much more accountable
organization” it is not just referring to accountability to refugees, it
acknowledging its accountability within the UN system.
Other relevant programmes or services are those that have been developed
internally or in collaboration with partners to create accountability obligations that
are specific to the UN’s functions and/or to particular position holders within the
UN. First, the UN Security Management System (UNSMS), whose mission it is
«to enable the conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the safety,
security and well-being of personnel and the security of United Nations premises
and assets», 60 creates a relationship between «Executive Heads of the United
Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes and the Secretary-General» to ensure
«that the goal of the UNSMS is met within their respective organizations».61 The
UNSMS Policy Manual expressly states that Executive Heads are responsible and
accountable to the Secretary-General and that in recognizing the coordinating role
and authority of the Secretary-General in matters related to the safety and security
of UN personnel, they commit themselves to ensuring that the goal of the
UNSMS is met.62
Second, the 2005 Inter-Agency Standing Committee Humanitarian Reform
Initiatives (IASC Initiatives) create a relationship between UNHCR and the UN
where the accountability obligations are specific to a particular area of the UN’s
functions (i.e. humanitarian aid) and the immediate recipients of accountability
are high-level office holders within the UN (the Emergency Relief Coordinator
and Humanitarian Coordinators). Under the IASC “cluster” model, a cluster lead
(UNHCR) is directly accountable to the Emergency Relief Coordinator for:
ensuring system-wide preparedness and technical capacity to respond to
humanitarian emergencies; ensuring greater predictability; and more effective
inter-agency responses in their particular sectors or areas of activity. 63 At a
country level, UNHCR is accountable to the Humanitarian Coordinator for
ensuring, to the extent possible, the establishment of adequate coordination
mechanisms for the sector or area of activity concerned; adequate preparedness;
and adequate strategic planning for an effective operational response.64
Not all of UNHCR’s organisational accountability obligations are so easily
identifiable, however. First, there is an “unspoken authority” implicit to
hierarchical accountability that can manifest in the way that the removal of senior
officials is dealt with. Whilst the appointment of senior officials within the UN
59
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may be a transparent process that is carried out according to formal and accepted
procedures, the removal of those officials from office can be far more opaque. The
election and re-election of the High Commissioner for Refugees is made by the
UNGA on the proposal of the UN Secretary-General and given formality and
transparency in the form of a UNGA decision.65 However, in circumstances where
a High Commissioner has vacated the office prior to the completion of his or her
term, he or she has generally resigned.
In 1989, the then High Commissioner for Refugees Jean-Pierre Hocke resigned
because of an accusation that he had used Danish contributions to «a fund set up
by Nordic countries for refugee education to pay for entertainment and first-class
air travel, sometimes aboard the Concorde, for himself and his wife».66 A number
of years later in 2005, a second scandal caused the resignation of another High
Commissioner, Ruud Lubbers, who was accused of sexually harassing a female
employee. Although both Commissioner’s resigned rather than being officially
removed from office, the extent to which their decisions were free from political
pressure, particularly from the UN Secretary-General, merits questioning. Despite
Mr Hocke maintaining that he «did not feel to have been pressured» in making his
decision, 67 some newspapers at the time reported that the then UN SecretaryGeneral, Javier Perez de Cuellar, told Hocke that he could not remain at his post.68
At the news conference announcing his resignation, Hocke read out a letter which
said, amongst other things, that his resignation did «not reflect any sentiment of
culpability on my part concerning any of my doings» and mentioned the
«destructive intentions of some people here and elsewhere». 69 Lubbers on the
other hand, spoke directly about the pressure placed on him by Koffi Annan, the
UN Secretary-General at the time, to resign. Although the day before the
announcement of his resignation, Lubbers had said that Annan had not asked him
to resign, in his resignation letter he said that Annan had given him two choices resign or face suspension and charges of breaking UN rules. Maintaining his
innocence, Lubbers said, «To be frank, and despite all my loyalty, insult has now
been added to injury and therefore I resign as High Commissioner».70
Resignation is a useful public relations tactic, a way to maximize damage
control in difficult circumstances. Although presented as a freely made decision, it
is likely that both Hocke and Lubbers were placed in positions where they were
left with little choice but to resign. Lubbers’ veiled accusation and Hocke’s denial
of culpability and counter-attack on persons unknown is testament to that. The UN
Secretary-General is highly influential in the election of a candidate to the office
of the High Commissioner and he or she is the ultimate authority in the removal,
or resignation of the Commissioner from office. Whether transparent or
65
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“unspoken”, the authority inherent in the ability of the Secretary-General to
influence the resignation of a High Commissioner without the need for more
formal “removal” procedures solidifies the relationship between the UN and
UNHCR as traditionally hierarchical and one that is based upon a model of
vertical accountability.
A second example of “unspoken authority” is where the UN Secretary-General
has made decisions to override action taken by High Commissioners, which
arguably exhibits authority that conflicts with the limited control model inherent
in the legal accountability obligations owed by UNHCR to the UN. The
reprimand of Sadako Ogata, High Commissioner for Refugees, by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General in February of 1993 was a clear indication
that in certain circumstances, the Secretary-General will override a High
Commissioner’s decision. It is arguable that such action has no basis in the terms
of UNHCR’s Statute or in its legal position as a subsidiary organ of the UN.
After High Commissioner Ogata had ordered the cessation of aid to some parts
of Yugoslavia due to militants impeding its delivery, Boutros-Ghali publicly
rebuked her and overturned her decision by ordering UNHCR to resume
humanitarian assistance to the area. 71 The UN Secretary-General is given no
specific authority to make such an order outside of the authority the UNGA and
ECOSOC are given to issue policy directives to the High Commissioner 72 or for
the UNGA to determine additional activities.73 As mentioned above, the phrase
«under the authority of the General Assembly» means that UNHCR acts at the
direction of the UNGA and not the UN Secretary-General74 or any other principal
organ of the UN such as the UN Security Council. If the authority to act in such a
manner does not find support in the constitution of UNHCR, might it be justified
by UNHCR’s position as a subsidiary organ of the UN? It is arguable that
Boutros-Ghali’s actions also went beyond that expected of a principal organ. In its
report on the accountability of IOs, the ILA considered that the power of a parent
organisation extended to the overruling of a decision of a subsidiary organ if that
decision was contrary to applicable legal rules. 75 It is difficult to see how a
decision made about humanitarian aid delivery could be so defined. The actions of
the UN Secretary-General were extraordinary, not only because they exposed
political conflicts over UN programme management76 but also because they were
a clear indication that the authority of the UN (in the guise of the UN SecretaryGeneral) over subsidiary organs has the potential to extend beyond legal rules into
“interference” with policy decisions made at the most senior levels.
The layers of accountability created by institutional factors in the context of
hierarchical relationships will generally have the effect of expanding the
71
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accountability obligations owed by the subordinate to the principal. However,
where that relationship is inter-institutional and the subordinate party is a
subsidiary of the principal, accountability must be reciprocal. Reciprocal or
“reverse” accountability means that, despite the centrality of supervision and
control in the role of the principal, the principal also owes accountability
obligations to the subsidiary. Under the heading “Supervision and Control” the
ILA report makes the following relevant recommendations:
1) IO-s remain fully accountable for the actions and omissions of subsidiary organs;
2) Parent organs have a duty to exercise a degree of control and supervision over
subsidiary organs which corresponds to the functional autonomy granted; […]
5) An organ of an IO that has delegated the exercise of any of its powers or functions
remains fully accountable for the way in which the power or function is being
exercised […].77

The ILA’s position that an IO is «fully accountable for the actions and
omissions of subsidiary organs» and for the way in which its delegated powers or
functions are exercised places important controls on the potential for the kind of
arbitrary exercise of authority that may occur within hierarchical relationships.
The ILA’s view of inter-organisational accountability reflects a strong compulsion
against tyrannical, unbridled authority within IO governance and has the effect of
reversing the vertical flow of accountability within the UN/UNHCR relationship
by turning UNHCR into a recipient of accountability.
UNHCR’s place in the UN system informs a more far-reaching concept of
accountability than its legal status as a subsidiary body implies. When the
hierarchical aspect of the relationship between a subsidiary and principal organ
manifests within a practical institutional context, accountability not only
subsumes existing organisational accountability mechanisms, it receives the
“unspoken” elements of authority that are inherent in hierarchical relationships.
The institutional design of UNHCR expands the relationship between UNHCR
and the UN by providing for accountability obligations that are additional to those
created by UNHCR’s Statute. Whilst most of these obligations increase the
accountability owed by UNHCR, some create an accountability obligation for the
UN in respect of the actions of UNHCR.

The complexities and intersections of UNHCR’s relationship with the UN are
represented in the following conceptual model, which maps the accountability
elements of the relationship between UNHCR and the UN.

Figure 1. UNHCR and the UN: Accountability Obligations
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The model identifies ten accountability obligations (represented by circles) that
are created by the relationship between UNHCR and the UN.
Three of these obligations, “report annually to UNGA”, “undertake additional
activities determined by UNGA” and “follow UNGA/ECOSOC policy directives”
are characterised through legal accountability (represented by dashed arrows).
The remaining six obligations are products of organisational accountability
(represented by solid arrows), five of which expand the authority of the UN and
the accountability obligations of UNHCR. One organisational accountability
obligation, “UNHCR’s actions, omissions, exercise of powers/function” creates a
reverse accountability obligation for the UN to take responsibility for the actions
of UNHCR.
Four of UNHCR’s accountability obligations intersect and potentially conflict
with each other. UNHCR’s legal accountability to “undertake additional activities
determined by UNGA” and “follow UNGA/ECOSOC policy directives” intersect
with its obligations to “defer to UNSG” and “follow UNSC resolutions” because

20

the latter require it to respond to authority within the UN in a way that is beyond
what is contemplated by UNHCR’s Statute and which arguably undermines its
independence.
Conclusion
The complexity of the inter-institutional relationship between UNHCR and the
UN renders attempts to draw bright lines around its nature futile. Its legal scope is
determined by UNHCR’s Statute and the implications of its position as a
subsidiary organ of the UN, but the institutionally hierarchical nature of the
relationship introduces less stable elements that expand, contract and occasionally
undermine its legal or constitutional parameters. In addition, UNHCR’s
institutional autonomy diminishes the practical authority that the UNGA holds as
principal organ. Counterintuitive as it may seem, the relationship is typical of
inter-institutional relationships in the global space in the sense that their
commonality is diversity, and to understand those relationships is to appreciate
and accept plurality.
Plurality is nowhere more relevant than in regards to global accountability, an
issue that occupies a significant portion of critical attention to global governance.
If there are to be “solutions” to the accountability issues created by a context
where the bounds on governance are weak and divergent, accountability must be
understood in relation to that context and not according to traditional notions that
are an uneasy fit for the global space. If accountability is understood in relation to
relationships, not only are the unique accountability obligations of a global body
revealed, the reasons why a body fails to be accountable becomes apparent.
Without this fundamental insight, accountability mechanisms risk becoming
aspirational tools that “say the right thing” yet remain ineffectual because of their
failure to understand and respond to their subject.
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